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I.  World knowledge and inference
Whether on-line or not, we are constantly making 
inferences in our daily life.  As Ueno (1999) states, we make 
inferences in order to identify and/or comprehend what is 
perceived through our senses, to speculate on the cause of 
the thing perceived, to make predictions about future events, 
or to understand or create coherent text (written or spoken). 
It is not very hard to imagine that the inferences thus made 
reflect our knowledge of the world acquired through our past 
experience.  In other words, our world knowledge based on 
our experience influences the inferences that we make, hence 
our perception and/or interpretation of the world we live in. 
Wason's (1966, 1968) four-card selection task well illustrates 
this point.
The world knowledge itself may vary individually from 
person to person, or socially/culturally from community to 
community.  However, there must be some basic principles 
common to all individuals that govern the organization and 
utilization of such knowledge in interpreting or creating 
discourse text.  
The theories that study the relationship between socio-
cultural knowledge and language can be divided into two 
groups.  The first group, which originates in the field of 
anthropology and is called ethnography of communication, 
sees  socio-cul tural  knowledge “as  revealed in  the 
performance of speech acts bounded in real time and space, 
and characterized by culturally specific values and norms 
that constrain both the form and the content of what is said” 
(Gumperz, 1982: 154).  In this view, therefore, interpretation 
of what is implied in what is said is not a major concern.  On 
the other hand, the second group focuses on how the world 
knowledge is applied to the interpretation of text (or, in a 
broader sense, to the interpretation of the world surrounding 
the interpreter).  World knowledge has to be organized and 
used according to some cognitive semantic structures.  These 
cognitive structures are called frames, scripts, scenarios, or 
schemata, depending on the theories.
In this paper, I would like to focus on some of the 
theories that address the issue of how world knowledge is 
organized to be used in text comprehension/creation, and their 
implications for foreign language teaching.
II.  Frames
The term frame occurs in many fields of science.  Tannen 
(1979: 141) points out that it is used, “in the work of Bateson 
and Frake in anthropology, Hymes and Goffman in sociology, 
Minsky in artificial intelligence, and Fillmore in linguistics.” 
Further, in analyzing discourse, Clark and Clark (1977: 34) 
use the term to refer to the first phrase of a sentence to make 
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a functional distinction with the remainder of the sentence 
(insert).1 First, I would like to examine Minsky’s (1974/1996, 
1977, 1986/1996) notion of frame because it directly concerns 
the organization and representation of world knowledge,2 
followed by Tannen’s notion of frame, which relates to the 
studies in anthropology, sociology, and linguistics.
II-1.  Minsky’s notion of frame
Minsky describes a frame as a “data-structure for 
representing a stereotyped situation” and summarizes its 
essence as follows:  
When one encounters a new situation 
(or makes a substantial change in one’s 
view of the present problem) one selects 
from memory a structure called a Frame. 
This is a remembered framework to be 
adapted to fit reality by changing details 
as necessary (Minsky, 1974/1996: 997).  
A frame consists of two parts, fixed part and changeable 
part. The former represents the things that are always true 
about the supposed situation.  The latter has many “slots” 
called terminals, where the specific values of a given instance 
of an entity notion or situation are stored according to 
assignment conditions that each slot specifies.  For example, 
if we are in a kitchen in a house that we visited for the first 
time, we store information of its size, colors of walls, floor, 
and ceiling, layout, electric appliances it has, etc. in terminals. 
If the value for a certain terminal cannot be determined, 
(i.e., if the information necessary to determine the value is 
simply missing), then the terminal is given a default setting 
(or assumption) as its typical value.  Thus, even if we do not 
see someone cooking in the kitchen, we can assume that the 
room is for cooking thanks to the default value of the “action” 
terminal of the kitchen frame.3 Similarly, even if we do not 
see kitchen utensils, we presume that they are there in the 
kitchen.  In this sense, as Johnson-Laird and Wason (1977) 
point out, the notion of a frame approximates that of Rosch’s 
“prototype”, since a prototype could be considered as a frame 
whose terminals for various variables are filled in with all the 
default values. 
An important point in this system is that different frames 
share the same terminals.  That is why a scene of the kitchen 
from one particular point of place and that from another, each 
of which making a different frame, can represent the effects 
of moving from one place to another.  Further, even when 
the frames are non-visual type, “cause-effect relations, or 
changes in conceptual viewpoints” can be represented by the 
differences between frames (Minsky, 1974/1996: 998).  
Although originally developed as a theory of visual 
perception and visual memory, Minsky’s notion of frame 
extends its application to language comprehension.  To 
illustrate this point, let us take a simple example from Minksy 
(1986/1996: 736).
(1)  Mary was invited to Jack’s party.
(2)  She wondered if he would like a kite.
Having read (1) and (2) in this order, we can infer that 
probably the party was Jack’s birthday party, and that the kite 
was a birthday present from Mary. We can also infer that both 
Mary and Jack are children or (at least Jack is a child).  Such 
interpretation would not be possible just by the identification 
of anaphoric referents of she and he in (2).  According to 
Minsky’s frame theory, (1) arouses a “party-invitation” frame 
in the reader’s mind.  Its terminals are attached to certain 
memories of various concerns such as “Who is the host?”, 
“What present should I bring?”, and “What should I wear?” 
Each of these concerns is represented by a subframe with its 
terminals filled with the most usual solutions to that particular 
problem.  The most usual solutions are based on our previous 
experience, that is assigned, in advance, as default values to 
the corresponding terminals.  
As seen in the example above, Minsky sees the 
activation of frames and filling of their terminals as a key to 
the comprehension of text.  The question here is whether we 
1 Clark and Clark (1977) explain the function of frame as to orient the listeners “toward a particular area of knowledge—to give them a point of 
departure for the sentence.”  Therefore, the notion of frame/insert substantially coincides with that of theme/rheme, and more importantly with the 
notion of starting point, a linguistic unit from the viewpoint of the serial word order (i.e., linearisation).
2 Schank and Abelson (1977) propose the notion script, which is similar to the notion of schema or frame but especially deals with event sequences.
3 Since the theory allows frames of other entities to be fillers for the terminals, the action of “cooking” and kitchen utensils such as a colander or an 
eggbeater themselves form their own frames (i.e., subframes). 
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really have to activate a frame for each and every thing we 
see, hear, or read in order to comprehend it.  Brown and Yule 
(1983) raise the same question, citing the following sentence 
from The Sunday Times.
(3)   The Cathedral  congregat ion had watched 
television monitors as Pope and Archbishop met, 
in front of a British Caledonian helicopter, on the 
dewy grass of a Canterbury recreation ground 
(Brown and Yule,  1983: 240).  
The question here is whether a Cathedral frame, a 
television-watching frame, a meeting frame, a helicopter 
frame, and a recreation-ground frame are all activated by the 
reader to comprehend this sentence without creating any mess 
in his/her short-term memory.  If only one/some of them is/
are activated, which ones will it/they be?  Brown and Yule 
suggest that this is a major problem with Minsky’s frame 
theory.  Examining Minsky’s explanation carefully, however, 
we could say that their criticism might be a little misleading.
It is true that Minsky emphasizes the importance of 
activation of various frames to understand discourse properly, 
but we have to be aware that such activation occurs in order to 
enable the comprehender to access stored data or knowledge 
called common sense (i.e., default assumptions that fill the 
relevant terminals) about a given object (concrete or abstract) 
or situation.  (Remember that most terminals are already filled 
with default assumptions.)  These excited (or “aroused” in 
Minsky’s term) frames lay a ground for the comprehender to 
process the next sentence.  In the example above, (1) activates 
a party-invitation frame together with other related frames 
and subframes, including such linguistic frames as a noun 
frame, a verb frame, and a sentence frame.  Now, common 
sense related to (i.e., filled in the terminals of) these activated 
frames is ready to recognize possible references to presents, 
clothes, the protagonist, etc. in (2).  
We have to remind ourselves of Minsky’s definition of 
a frame.  He states that a frame is a data-structure for storing 
and representing a stereotyped situation, and that it is selected 
from memory when one encounters a new situation or makes 
a substantial change in one’s view of the present problem. 
In other words, if there is no change in the situation or no 
change in one’s view, there will be no selection of a frame.  It 
is selected only when it is necessary to adapt one’s common 
sense acquired from previous experience to the reality that he 
is experiencing now.  Modification to one’s common sense is 
done by filling some of the terminals with new data.  
Here, no selection does not mean no activation of frames. 
Various frames could be activated, but the activation is done 
only to facilitate comprehension by making common sense 
ready to provide proper context for the text.  Still, if there 
is nothing that would threaten the validity of the existing 
common sense, no selection occurs because it is not necessary 
to modify it.  I argue, therefore, that criticism against 
Minsky’s frame theory resulted from confusion between 
selection and activation (arousal, or excitement) of a frame 
is invalid.  It would not be too much to say that the notion 
of frame as a data-structure for representing a stereotyped 
situation has provided helpful hints on how new situations are 
dealt with, and how new data are stored.  As such, it has also 
benefited linguistics in the analysis of text comprehension. 
For example, Fillmore’s (1976, 1985) frame semantics 
emphasizes the importance of reference to a set of culturally 
familiar frames in understanding meaning.  
Tannen (1979, 1986, 1990) also uses the term "frame" 
in relation to metamessages which is implicitly conveyed by 
words or actions to refer to the relations among the people 
involved, and their attitudes toward what they are saying or 
doing and toward the people they are saying or doing it to. 
Although Tannen’s notion of frame (together with the term 
metamessages) is from an anthropologist Gregory Bateson 
and is not directly related to Minsky’s frame theory, both 
share a basic concept about a function of world knowledge in 
language comprehension:  Discourse cannot be successfully 
understood without reference to culturally constrained 
assumptions about the world (i.e., common sense shared by 
the people within a community).  
Regardless of the similarities in names and basic concepts 
between these two notions of frame, it would be necessary to 
distinguish them here.  In order to avoid a possible confusion 
between the two notions, I would like to touch upon Tannen’s 
notion of frame or framing in the next section. 
II-2.  Tannen’s notion of frame and framing 
Tannen explains the concept of frame as “a way of 
showing how we mean what we say or do and figuring out 
how others mean what they say or do (Tannen, 1986: 74-75).” 
Our utterances are framed by conversational signals (pacing 
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and pausing, loudness, pitch and intonation), conversational 
devices (expressive reaction, asking questions, complaining, 
apologizing), and non-verbal signals (facial expression, 
gestures) so that they carry some specific metamessages, such 
as this is a joke, I am serious, this is a warning, or I am more 
competent than you are.  
For example, the sentence “I am sorry” uttered loudly 
with angry facial expressions might be good enough to mean 
something like “I am saying this not because I feel sorry or 
I want to apologize.  I am saying this to satisfy you so that 
you will shut up.”  Further, Tannen points out that framing 
may reveal what position the speaker is assuming, and what 
position he/she assigns to the listener.  By putting the listener 
down, the speaker is taking a superior position (or "alignment" 
in sociologist Erving Goffman’s term).  Tannen’s (1990) 
example of a driver waving his hand to another driver to yield 
the right-of-way illustrates this point.  Instead of taking this 
action as kindness, the second driver interprets it as “I am 
granting you my own right to go ahead.”  Consequently, he 
turns down the offer and waves back to the first driver.  Here, 
the second driver sensed the first driver’s higher position 
framed by the first and reframed the relative position as “No, I 
am higher,” or at least, “No, we are on the equal position” by 
rejecting the offer and waving the first driver on.   
Reactions to the frames set by others (i.e., whether to 
resist or to accept them) may reflect gender difference as 
Tannen suggests.   Or, they might reflect individual habits, 
the person’s state of mind on that particular day, and/or his/
her cultural background.  If interpretation of frames and 
reaction to them vary individually or socially, there is always 
a possibility of miscommunication.  In other words, since 
conversational signals, conversational devices, and non-verbal 
signals frame our utterances and actions, different expectations 
about these communicative signals between interlocutors 
may make communication unsuccessful.  It is on this point 
that Tannen’s notion of frame and Minsky’s agree.  Whether 
the different expectations are based on gender difference 
as Tannen (1986, 1990) emphasizes or cultural difference, 
communication will fail if we are unaware or ignorant of such 
differences in expectations, or if our world knowledge does 
not contain the relevant information on them.
Now, going back to the example of the driver who 
declined the offer of the right-of-way from another driver, 
why did he think that the first driver was assuming a higher 
position?  What is his reaction based on?  Would that be 
gender, culture, or just his personality?  Tannen’s answer 
consists in two important concepts, involvement and 
independence. 
Tannen (1986) states that everyone has two conflicting 
needs in terms of relationship to others; the needs for 
involvement (i.e., the needs to be connected to others) on one 
hand, and the needs for independence (i.e., the needs to be 
left alone) on the other.4 She claims that generally men feel 
the needs for independence, while women feel the needs for 
involvement.  Here, supposing that the second driver is a man, 
he may have taken the offer from (or a frame set by) the first 
driver as a threat to his independence.  To him, accepting the 
frame was to admit that he was not independent, or that he 
was subordinate to the first driver.  If the second driver was a 
woman, she might have taken the offer without reframing the 
frame set by the first driver.
Tannen explains that many instances of miscommunication 
between men and women are derived from this gender 
difference in attitudes toward others.  Accordingly, she claims 
that a key factor to successful communication between men 
and women is to know these conflicting needs of the other 
gender and to try to balance them within themselves with the 
help of conversational signals and devices. 
This suggests that if communicative signals are not 
available, communication might fail even between the 
two persons of the same gender.  We can easily find many 
instances of misunderstanding in electronic mail exchange 
if we subscribe to some mail lists on the Internet, which 
distribute every message posted to all their members.  In 
e-mail, as well as in any other type of writing, we cannot use 
conversational signals as in the face-to-face conversation.  The 
only thing we could do is invent alternative ways of signaling 
our metamessages.  We could use bold face or upper case 
letters to mean that we are emphasizing the words, (though 
upper case words usually mean I am shouting! in an e-mail 
4  Gray (1992) makes a similar point, expressing the conflicting needs within men as the needs for “autonomy” and the needs for “intimacy”. 
According to him, men are balancing them by pulling away to achieve autonomy and getting close for intimacy just like a “rubber band”.
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message.)  A simplified illustration of a smiling face called 
Smiley might be useful from time to time.  
However, these devices that mimic conversational 
signals are very much limited both in number and in function. 
To make matters worse, e-mail messages are written quickly 
without giving much attention to wording, not to mention 
rhetoric.  The result is, as Levine and Baroudi (1993) warn, 
that e-mail always seems ruder than it is supposed to.  We 
may sometimes even feel that we are “flamed”.  This happens 
because we cannot detect a frame that the writer set for the 
message.  Even if we have invented a large number of symbols 
to label frames, they would not be of much use if the receiver 
of a message does not know the conventions that we are trying 
to establish.  It parallels the situation where we do not have 
adequate information about cultural differences in the use of 
communicative signals.  We have to say, once again, that in 
order to comprehend communicative signals correctly, our 
world knowledge reservoir has to contain relevant information 
to decode them.  If not, communication could fail.  
Likewise, lack of relevant information about different 
cultures could lead to misinterpretation of the speaker’s 
intention.  Tannen gives an example of a Japanese woman 
talking about her husband’s recent death with a smile (not 
with "laughs" as Tannen states, though.)  Expressing too much 
emotion might offend the listener because it could be taken as 
imposition of one’s emotion on others (, which Tannen might 
call a threat or a challenge to the listener’s independence). 
Indeed, this might even be a universal principle across 
different languages and cultures.  However, in Japan, the 
principle goes to the extreme:  Woman may smile while 
talking about her husband’s death.  As Tannen explains, the 
woman might be misdiagnosed by a Westerner who does not 
know that laughter (or smile) is “the customary and expected 
Japanese way of masking emotions (Tannen, 1986: 41).”  A 
smiling face when feeling intolerable sadness deep inside 
would be totally inappropriate in other cultures.  In Japan, 
however, this is not an uncommon strategy for avoiding 
making a conversational partner feel uncomfortable.  Death of 
a person is certainly not a pleasing topic to anybody.  In order 
to cancel out the negative or unpleasant connotation of the 
topic, the speaker tries to use whatever strategies available. 
To most Japanese people, a smiling face is a tool to set a 
frame to show their solicitude for the listener’s feelings.  With 
such knowledge, we can correctly interpret the woman’s smile 
as “I do not want you to feel bad like I am feeling now.”5 
To sum, if socially-culturally conventionalized norms 
about communicative signals and their meanings are not 
shared by the interlocutors, or in Gumperz’s (1982) terms, if 
conventionalized co-occurrence expectations between content 
and surface style (i.e., contextualization cues) are not shared 
by them, there would be a mismatch between conversational 
inferences that the speaker has in mind and those that the 
listener makes, and consequently communication would fail. 
In the next section, we will see some more evidence for the 
relations between socio-cultural knowledge and discourse 
comprehension.
III.  Schema theory
Similar to the notion of frame is that of schema originally 
put forth by Bartlett (1932).  Having English speaking 
subjects recall the stories of Native Americans, Bartlett (1932) 
found that the subjects not only had difficulty remembering 
them but even reorganized them.  Based on these findings, 
he argued that recalling a bizarre story was poor because the 
subjects tried to alter its details so that it fit into their existing 
schemata.  Referring to this study, the notion of schema is 
generally explained as “a structure in semantic memory that 
specifies the general or expected arrangement of a body of 
information” (Caroll, 1986: 231).  As for a story schema, it 
may be culture-specific as shown by Bartlett, or may be genre-
specific.  For example, in reading an article in a newspaper, 
we expect that the headline provides the information on what 
the article is about, that the lead summarizes the incident or 
accident, and that its detailed account will follow later in 
the article.  In reading detective stories, we do not expect a 
suspect will be caught early in the story.  Such expectations 
are possible because we have a semantic structure or 
knowledge structure called schema that we have made based 
on our previous encounters with many types of discourse.  
Bartlett explains that the past experience works as a 
5  Culturally imposed meaning on this type of strategy has to do with the concept of politeness shared by the Japanese.  The concern about listeners’ 
feelings may have been the origin of honorifics in the Japanese language.
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whole, not as an each individual instance; “the past operates 
as an organized mass rather than as a group of elements 
each of which retains its specific character (1932: 197).”  In 
other words, schemata are generalized assumptions (about 
organization of a body of information) abstracted from the 
aggregate of each instance that we have encountered in the 
past.6 Therefore, by definition, a schema may also undergo 
modification according to our new experience.  Here, its 
similarity to Minsky’s frame is obvious. 
Considering the fact that various schemata are 
constructed and modified not only through our personal 
experience but also by the norms of a society in which we live, 
there is no doubt that some schemata will be culture specific. 
Using R.N.Ross’s term “structures of expectations,”  Tannen 
(1979) also treats schemata as structures of expectations 
organized according to “one’s experience of the world in a 
given culture (or combination of cultures)”.  The organized 
knowledge about the world is, in turn, used to “predict 
interpretations and relationships regarding new information, 
events, and experiences (1979: 138-139)”.
A schema may reveal itself as a prejudice against or a 
bias for something or somebody, influencing our interpretation 
of stories, movies (including interpretation of physical 
movements of something/somebody which are not connected 
from one scene to another, as continuous motions), or 
virtually anything that exists in this world as long as we have 
encountered them enough times to create a certain schema.  If 
it really exists, a schema will surely help us infer the things 
that are not explicitly said or written in text, what is going 
to happen next, and the things that are not perceived by our 
senses.
In the next section, limiting our topic to discourse 
comprehension, I would like to look at some of the schema 
theories on discourse structure.
III-1.  Schema and discourse structure  
Among several models that have been proposed to deal 
with how discourse is structured, Labov & Waletzky’s (1967) 
study is perhaps worth mentioning first here for two reasons: 
(1) The data analyzed were actual narratives told by the 
subjects (i.e., they were not created by the researchers to serve 
for a specific study), and (2) the data were collected from a 
large number of subjects who widely ranged in age.
Seeking for basic structures of complex narratives, 
Labov & Waletzky (1967) analyzed the tape-recorded data of 
oral narratives of personal experiences gathered from about 
600 interviews.  The English speaking subjects of 10 to 72 
years old were drawn as narrators from both black and white 
communities of both rural and urban areas in the U.S.
Although narrative units recapitulate experience of series 
of events, the order of those units in a narrative does not 
always correspond to the temporal sequence of the original 
events.  Hence, focusing their attention on the types of clauses 
and their orders in narratives, Labov & Waletzky attempted 
to find some organizational principles according to which 
narratives were constructed.
First, they found that some clauses could be placed 
anywhere in the narrative without changing the inferred 
sequence of events in the original semantic interpretation 
(hence, named free clause), and some were restricted to some 
degree in terms of possible positions they could take (hence, 
named restricted clause).  Further, those clauses that were 
6  Schemata in this sense corresponds to Oller’s (1995) formal schemata. In relation to Peirce’s three modes of inference, Oller classifies schemata 
into three kinds, content schemata, formal schemata, and abstract shemata.  Content schemata, which are based on abduction, concern particular 
arrangements or relationships of things in the world that we perceive in a particular context of experience.  Formal schemata, which are mainly based 
on induction, are concerned with generalized assumptions about arrangements or relationships of the things that we have abstracted to some degree 
from the particular facts indexed as being similar.  In Abstract Schemata, whose concept parallels deduction, the assumptions obtain the complete 
generality of pure symbols.
For example, the number of classrooms, names of students, cultural background of each student, and the rules of a particular school are all part of 
content schemata.  If some similar facts are observed at many elementary schools to the extent that we can generalize them as applicable to all other 
schools, the generalized assumptions are now part of formal schemata.  On the other hand, when we hear the words ‘elementary school’, we all can 
infer that there must be classrooms where teachers teach children of a certain age range.  The concept of ‘elementary school’ as a place for education 
is embedded in the meaning or definition of the words itself.  The definition of the words (i.e., symbols) ‘elementary school’ is not dependent on the 
similarities observable among many elementary schools.  Rather, it is integrated in our abstract schemata.  With this classification, Oller examines 
the results of recent empirical studies to show how these schemata influence discourse processing.  He claims that abstract schemata have the 
greatest impact of the three, and that formal schemata have greater impact than content schemata.  I will refer to some of the studies in Section III-3.
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strictly fixed in position in the sequence were named narrative 
clause.
By observing the distribution of clauses over the 
entire narrative, Labov & Waletzky found that four basic 
components were operative in narratives; that is, orientation, 
complication (complicating action), evaluation, and resolution. 
The orientation section provides background information such 
as person, place, time, and behavioral situation.  It is mainly 
composed of free clauses that precede the first narrative 
clause.  The complication section consists of series of events 
and is represented by the main body of narrative clauses 
whose order in the story corresponds to that of actual events. 
A long string of events may consist of several cycles of simple 
narrative, with many complication sections, each of which is 
normally terminated by a result.  
In the evaluation, narrators express their attitudes, 
personal feelings or judgments towards the events by 
emphasizing the relative importance of some narrative units 
as compared to others.   The section also serves as a marker 
to separate the complication from the following resolution. 
Groups of free or restricted clauses are often found in this 
section, but a single narrative clause may states both the result 
and its importance.  A narrative may have more than one 
evaluation, each of which is followed by the resolution, the 
fourth component.  When this happens, a narrative becomes 
more complex in its structure than the primary sequence.  
The resolution section, following the evaluation, 
mainly consists of narrative clauses, and shows the result or 
outcome of events.  When the evaluation is the last element, 
the resolution may coincide with the evaluation.  Further, an 
optional section called coda may appear to return the verbal 
perspective to the present moment.7
Identifying each narrative component as the above, 
Labov & Waletzky represented the standard structure of 
narratives in the diagram as in Figure 4 below.
The significance of this study lies in the fact that Labov 
& Waletzky showed the relationship between the sequence of 
clauses in a narrative and the sequence of events inferred from 
the narrative.  If there were no mechanism relating the two, 
we would not be able to reconstruct the sequence of events 
in the original order when we try to comprehend a narrative. 
To see the narrative structure in terms of the arrangement of 
its components is compatible with the theories that view the 
discourse structure (or macrostructure) in terms of a schema 
(Mandler and Johnson, 1977; Rumelhart, 1975, 1977; Schank, 
1976; Thorndyke, 1977).
For example, Thorndyke (1977) claims that narrative 
discourse is structured with several components which 
are hierarchically organized according to a set of rules 
like phrase-structure rules.8 He further tried to show the 
psychological validity of this structure by claiming that in 
recall and summarization tests, the components at the top of 
the hierarchy were recalled most easily and included in the 
summaries.  
Here, we have to note that classification of clauses into 









Adapted from Labov & Waletzky (1967:  41)
7  Labov & Waletzky list three main devices for this function.  (1) Use of deixis:  By using the words such as “this” or “here”, for example, we can 
stand at the present moment of time, and point to the end of the narrative with “that” or “there”.  (2) Use of an incident in which one of the actors 
can be followed up to the present moment in actions.  (3) Extension of the effect of the narrative on the narrator to the present moment.
8  The following is an extract from Thorndyke’s rules (Thorndyke, 1977: 79).
1. Story-> Setting + Theme + Plot + Resolution,  2. Setting -> Characters + Location + Time,   3. Theme -> (Event)* + Goal,  4. Plot -> Episode*,  5. 
Episode -> Subgoal +  Attempt* + Outcome,  6. Attempt ->Event*/Episode,  7. Outcome -> Event*/State,  8. Resolution -> Event/State,  9. Subgoal/
Goal -> Desired State,  10. Characters/Location/Time -> State
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8) relies on reader/listener’s subjective judgment about 
the meaning and the function of each clause in the entire 
discourse.  We can label them because we have comprehended 
the story as a whole.  It should not be the other way around: 
We comprehend the story because we have successfully 
labeled the units.  It is true that a tree structure derived from 
the rules of a story grammar is helpful to capture the overall 
structure of a story.  However, as for the details in the structure 
(e.g., the structure of the components at the low level of the 
hierarchy), it would be difficult to prove its validity.  Actually, 
the overall picture of a tree structure could easily get much 
more complicated than the surface form of the discourse. 
Would it not be good enough or more practical to state that 
a story is generally composed of Setting, Theme, Plot, and 
Resolution, or of Orientation, Complication, Evaluation 
(including its cyclic function to transform the primary 
sequence into a more complex normal form of a narrative), 
and of Resolution as Labov & Waletzky argued?  It may be 
only these types of basic components that guide our discourse 
processing.
III-2.  van Dijk’s macrostructure, and superstructure 
In an attempt to formulate the formal means of 
identifying a topic for discourse, van Dijk (1977) also tried to 
analyze the structure of discourse.  His more recent work on 
the analysis of the structure of news articles is an example of 
application of his theory.  Van Dijk’s (1988a, 1988b) analysis 
is based on his notions of Macrostructure, Microstructure, 
and Superstructure (van Dijk, 1980).  Macrostructure refers 
to a semantic global structure, whose functions are (1) to 
organize complex information as a coherent whole, and 
(2) to reduce complex information to relevant, abstract, or 
general information (i.e., topics or themes represented by 
macropropositions) by way of three reduction rules called 
macrorules9. Microstructure is a semantic detailed structure 
at a more local level, such as the meanings of words, phrases, 
clauses, sentences, and connections between sentences. 
Superstructure is a conventional schematic global structure 
of a discourse.  In discourse analysis, it may be characterized 
as a syntactic skeleton of text. (Superstructure is also called 
supersyntax by van Dijk (1988b).  It could be understood as 
what traditionally called schema).  
Borrowing Labov’s notion of narrative units, van 
Dijk claims that when a discourse of any type is organized 
according to a conventional schema, its structure is realized 
as the ordering of functional categories, such as setting, 
complication, resolution, etc., which act as sort of slots 
to be filled with the content of the text, namely sequences 
of propositions (macropropositions).   Consequently, 
superstructures impose some constraints on macrostructures 
by specifying what kind of information is appropriate or 
needed in each slot.  
With this theoretical framework, van Dijk (1988a) 
analyzes 729 articles from 138 newspapers in 99 countries. 
Although the expected organizational (schematic) differences 
supposedly rooted in cultural, economical, and political 
differences between the First World and the Third World press 
were not found in this study (probably because most of the 
Third World press use materials from the major news agencies 
in the First World such as the AP or the Reuters and literally 
copy the news text for their own papers), we may be able to 
look at it as the evidence that the news press all over the world 
(and probably the readers as well) are following “globally 
shared code of journalistic practices”.   
As a consumer of the news articles, we consciously 
utilize our knowledge of the structure of news articles.  When 
we do not need detailed information on some news, we can 
just read the Headline and Lead which are placed at the very 
beginning of the article.  From the position of a text on the 
page and its type face, we can also infer whether or not it is a 
major news of the previous day.  This is certainly not the way 
we read other types of text, for example, empirical research 
papers.  
Van Dijk’s approach to discourse analysis seems to 
be parallel to the approach of traditional transformational 
generative grammar for the analysis of a sentence.  In this 
context, his claim that superstructures and macrostructures 
serve as underlying structures of sequences of sentences in 
9 The rules concern (1) deletion of all information that is not relevant in the rest of the text, (2) generalization of a sequence of propositions by a 
single proposition, (e.g., “We have pets,” generalized from “We have a dog, a cat, and a canary.”), and (3) construction of overall event out of its 
constituent details, (e.g., “I took a plane to ..,” constructed from “I went to the airport, checked in, walked to the gate, and got on a plane.”)
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texts, and his proposal of transformation-like rules for the 
organization of discourse categories (e.g., rules concerning 
ordering, deletion, or combination of categories), are 
understandable.  
However, the more details the theory try to explain, 
the stronger the type of criticism I mentioned at the end of 
the previous section will be.  In addition, it is not clear as to 
how many superstructure types should be considered if, as 
he claims, functional categories are specific for each type of 
discourse, and exactly what type of transformation rules are 
necessary in each type.  But again, the clearer are these points 
made, the more ad hoc the analysis may seem (See Ueno, 
2003, for more detailed discussion on Van Dijk’s theory).
IV.  Schema and its implications in foreign language 
teaching
As stated before, some schemata are culture specific. 
Accordingly, we can imagine that those culture-specific 
schemata will have some effects on second/foreign language 
learning/teaching.  In this section, I would like to discuss 
some of the studies that provide the evidence of the effects of 
culture-specific schemata on the processing of discourse, and 
also refer to what these studies imply for successful second/
foreign language learning/teaching.  
Chihara, Sakurai, and Oller (1989) examined how 
minor changes in textual elements to conform to the cultural 
background of the subjects (Japanese female junior college 
students) would affect their performance on cloze tests.  With 
a few modifications to the text (e.g., names and actions of the 
characters), the subjects scored significantly higher than with 
unmodified versions.  
The findings of Chihira et al. (1989) were replicated by 
Al-Fallay (1994) with Arab students learning English in Saudi 
Arabia.  Two stories, (English translation of one originally 
Arabic narrative and one originally English narrative), 
were used in the study.  By changing the names of persons, 
places, and events, the translation version was modified to 
fit American culture, resulting in two versions (modified 
and unmodified) of English translation of the Arabic story. 
Likewise, the English story was modified to conform to 
Arabic context, resulting in two versions (modified and 
unmodified) of the originally English story.  On the cloze tests 
administered five times throughout the quarter, the subjects 
who were given the texts in Arabic context scored higher 
than those who received the texts in non-Arabic context. 
Moreover, by comparing pretest and posttest scores, Al-Fallay 
reports that by taking cloze tests in culturally familiar context 
over a period time, the subjects in the experimental group 
benefited more (i.e., learned more) than those in the control 
group. 
What the findings of these studies suggest has a 
significant meaning to language teachers.  In preparing 
teaching materials or assessing the language skills of their 
students, second/foreign language teachers cannot ignore 
the impact of such culture-specific schemata.  Introducing 
new grammatical rules or words in a discourse which is 
built up on the schemata culturally different from those of 
students may not be as effective as expected.  Such materials 
could be an extra burden on the part of the students; that 
is, they have to learn grammatical rules and words that are 
embedded in the materials that they can not easily understand 
and remember.  At the same time, second/foreign language 
learners should be aware of the fact that knowledge of 
vocabulary and grammatical rules of a target language is not 
good enough to interpret a discourse constructed on culturally 
different schemata.  Students’ efforts may not be greatly 
rewarded unless cultural aspects of the language, such as 
different expectations (or, in Minsky’s term, different default 
settings for terminals in a frame) about people’s actions and 
reactions in interaction with others, narrative structure, non-
verbal communicative tools, etc. are learned by the students 
themselves.  What schema-based theories imply to second/
foreign language teachers and students should not be made 
light of.  After all, it concerns their ultimate objective;  to 
learn the language successfully on the learners’ part and to 
enhance effectively the learners’ fluency in the language on 
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